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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONNA LEE, a Minor, by and 
through her Guardian ad Litem, 
LOFTIN LEE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JEANNE W. HOWES, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
Case No. 14128 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the minor plaintiff to 
recover damages for personal injuries allegedly arising out 
of a motor vehicle-pedestrian accident on November 5, 1973 
near the intersection of Mantle Avenue and 2200 West in 
Salt Lake County, Utah at approximately 6:30 p.m. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before an eight-member jury 
who answered special interrogatories and found that the defend-
ant was not negligent, which finding had two dissenting jurors, 
and in addition found that the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent. On plaintiff's contributorily negligence the 
verdict was unanimous. Based upon the jury's answers to 
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interrogatories the Court entered its judgment on the verdict 
in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff, No Cause of 
Action. Thereafter the Trial Court denied plaintiff's Motion 
for New Trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the disposition 
reached by the jury and the Court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff's statement of the facts is essentially 
correct only pertaining to the time and place of the accident. 
The facts thereafter are in substantial dispute. As opposed 
to plaintiff's statement of facts, the facts as developed at 
trial from defendant's viewpoint are as follows: 
The defendant, a 22 year old married woman (Tr. 289) 
who worked at the Valley Fair Mall, drove home from work alone, 
never having anyone ride with her. (Tr. 290). On the date of 
the accident she got off work between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. It 
was Mvery dark,f and since one could not see without headlights, 
she had her lights on. (Tr. 292). The mall is several blocks 
north of the accident scene. (Tr. 293). Defendant traveled 
south at 25 miles per hour. (Tr. 293). She went through the 
intersection of Mantle Avenue and 2200 West without incident 
(Tr. 294), looked at the speedometer (Tr. 293), a car from the 
south passed going the other direction. (Tr. 294). At about 
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the same moment, and while she was in front of a house num-
bered 4246 on Exhibit D-l (Tr. 294), the plaintiff darted 
out from the left of defendant's vehicle, into defendant's 
path. (Tr. 295). The plaintiff was running fast (Tr. 319) 
and defendant could do nothing to avoid the collision. (Tr. 295^ 
The plaintiff hit the front of defendant's car, then rolled off 
the edge, not staying on the car. (Tr. 295). The impact hap-
pened just north of the mail box, which was approximately 90 
feet south of the intersection. (Tr. 296, Ex. D-l). The de-
fendant fell in about the same location as where the impact 
occurred. (Tr. 296, 306). 
The plaintiff prior to the impact with the auto-
had been on the southeast corner of the intersection of Mantle 
Avenue and 2200 West with six of her friends f?goofing around". 
(Tr. 242). After the plaintiff washed a boy's face with snow 
he chased the plaintiff, her cousin Julie, and friend Marilyn. 
(Tr. 244, 323). Both Julie and Marilyn saw defendant's car and 
stopped. (Tr. 245, 324). Plaintiff, however, never did see 
defendant's vehicle. (Tr. 195). There was no obstruction 
preventing her from seeing a car approaching from the north. 
(Tr. 196). 
The damage on the front of defendant's car's hood 
was "pretty minor". (Tr. 218). The police officer in his re-
port stated that the pedestrian was not crossing within the 
crosswalk and during his investigation he received no con-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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flicting report. (Tr. 217), 
Plaintiff's injuries were minor and did not 
require hospitalization other than emergency room care. (Tr. 170 
178). She had abrasions on her forehead, (Tr. 180) and left 
elbow. (Tr. 185). The bruises have healed well and she has 
no discomfort except if she bumps her elbow or hip a certain 
way. (Tr. 199). The injuries have healed well with no com-
plications. (Tr. 254, 255). 
The plaintiff saw her treating physician on 
November 8, 1973, three days after the accident, again on 
November 21, 1973, on December 12, 1973 and on February 15, 
1974. This was the last time she saw Dr. Larsen until the 
trial over a year later. (Tr. 169, 170). In the interim, 
the plaintiff was examined by Dr. Youngblood on March 8, 
1974 (Tr. 254) and again just before the trial on March 10, 
1975. (Tr. 255). 
The jury below answered a special verdict and 
found that defendant was not negligent. Two jurors dissented 
to this finding. The jury also found unanimously that the 
plaintiff was negligent and that her negligence was the 
cause of her own injuries. The jury further showed their 
intent by indicating that plaintiff should receive no amount 
of money for her personal injury or for her medical expense 
and lost clothing. (R. 93-94). The Court refused to grant a 
new trial and this appeal then ensued. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT BELOW IS SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) and (7), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, plaintiff seeks a new trial on the basis 
of insufficient evidence to justify the verdict and error in 
law. The test as to sufficiency in such cases is whether 
reasonable minds could be convinced by the facts in evidence 
which are necessary to support the verdict. Horsley v. 
Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 597 (1947). There must 
be an absence of evidence against the prevailing party below 
or a decided preponderance thereof in favor of Appellant be-
fore the verdict will be set aside. People v. Swasey, 6 Utah 93, 
21 Pac. 400 (1889); see also, Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 
17 U.2d 375, 412 P.2d 615, 617 (1966). As can be readily 
seen from the statement of facts above there was substantial 
evidence upon which the jury could support its verdict and 
from which reasonable minds could be convinced. 
As can be seen from the conflicting statements 
of fact presented by the brief's of Appellant and Respondent 
herein, there were numerous and substantial conflicts in the 
evidence produced at trial. As this Court has stated on 
numerous occasions, conflicts in the evidence must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below. 
c 
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Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 U.2d 133, 355 
P.2d 714 (1960). See also: Larson v. Evans, 12 U.2d 24 5, 
364 P.2d 1088 (1961). On the subject of conflicts in the 
evidence this Court has said: 
But one question is presented 
on this appeal: are the verdict 
and judgment sustained by the evi-
dence? No useful purpose would be 
subserved by setting forth the testi-
mony of the various witnesses. We 
have read the record carefully. The 
evidence is in conflict, but the jury 
could well have come to the conclusion 
it did. It is not for us to weigh 
the evidence and substitute our judg-
ment for that of the jury and trial 
court. In re GordonTs Estate, 101 
Utah 523, 125 P.2d 413 (1942). 
Considering the issues on appeal, the evidence is viewed 
most favorably to the prevailing party below, and all reason-
able presumptions are in favor of the validity of the verdict. 
Morris v. Christensen, 11 U.2d 140, 356 P.2d 34 (1960); 
Gibbons § Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 123 Utah 172, 256 P.2d 706 (1953). 
Determination of the credibility of witnesses 
should belong exclusively to the jury. It is the jury that 
has the exclusive prerogative of passing upon the credibility 
of the evidence and of determining the facts. Flynn v. W. P. 
Harlin Construction Company, 29 U.2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973). 
In that case this court stated: 
It has long been established in 
our law that a court should not take 
the case from a jury where there is 
any substantial dispute in the evi-
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dence on issues of fact, but can pro-
perly do so only when the matter is 
so plain that there really is no con-
flict in the evidence upon which reason-
able minds could differ. (Citations 
omitted). As was said for this Court 
long ago by a greatly respected Justice •,: 
Frick: ". . .unless the question is 
free from doubt, the Court cannot pass 
upon it as a matter of law. . . --
. . . if . . . the Court is in doubt 
whether reasonable men, . . . might 
arrive at different conclusion, then 
this very doubt determines the question 
to be one of fact for the jury and not 
one of law for the Court. (Citation 
omitted). 
The issue presented for consideration under 
this point is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain 
a verdict for no liability. Relative to this question the 
evidence sustaining the verdice is that Mrs. Howes was driving 
within the speed limit, on a very dark night and using her 
headlights. After going through an intersection and traver-
sing a crosswalk without incident a girl ran fast into the 
path of defendant's vehicle just after a northbound vehicle 
passed the defendant. Mrs. Howes was given no warning of the 
approach of the plaintiff and had no time to take evasive 
action. The plaintiff struck the front of the car and rolled 
off the right side onto the ground and was found in the same 
location where she was struck, approximately 90 feet from the 
crosswalk. Both the damage to the front of the defendant's 
vehicle and the injuries to the plaintiff are consistent with 
a low speed inpact and with the plaintiff being struck close 
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to where she fell. It is totally unreasonable that such 
minor damage to the car and minor injury to the plaintiff 
would have occurred if the defendant's speed would have been 
greater and if the plaintiff would have been hit while in or 
near to the crosswalk and would have been thrown 90 feet as 
claimed by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff relies heavily on measurements and 
calculations that plaintiff's attorney makes in his brief. 
On cross-examination by plaintiff's attorney the defendant 
stated that she looked at her speedometer just before the 
northbound car passed her. (Tr. 301). Plaintiff's counsel 
then had the defendant indicate on Exhibit D-l where this 
would have been. In doing so she said "about here I would 
say." (Tr. 301). With this information which is obviously 
and of necessity meant to be approximate, plaintiff has 
attempted precise measurements and calculations and suggests 
it was impossible for the defendant to look at her speedometer, 
observe a car northbound, and see the plaintiff dart in front 
of her vehicle. His measurement indicates that this would 
have had to take place within 15 feet while traveling 25 miles 
per hour. Such an approach is a ploy used by counsel to obtain 
an approximation from a witness and then to use that approxi-
mation in making exact calculations. This is the kind of ex-
ercise which received Justice Henroid's disapproval when he 
said in his opinion that such a procedure "... lays undue 
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emphasis on split-second calculations indulged in hypothetical 
questions based on conjecture." Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U.2d 435, 
326 P.2d 722, 727 (1958). 
Plaintiff's brief claims that defendant was neg-
ligent in failing to yield the right-of-way because it is 
"undisputed in the evidence that plaintiff was in the cross-
walk until she reached the center of the street." Plaintiff 
by her own argument admits that she was not in the crosswalk 
at the time of the accident. In fact it is disputed that she 
was in the crosswalk at all since defendant's testimony puts 
her some 90 feet from the crosswalk when she was struck. This 
is the evidence that is supported by the jury verdict and the 
verity of such verdict must therefore be presumed. 
On pages 21 and 22 of Plaintiff's brief the 
Plaintiff attempts to state the evidence most favorable to the 
defendant. She states that having ample opportunity to do 
so defendant failed to see the plaintiff until she hit her. 
To the contrary, the evidence shows that defendant had no 
opportunity to see the plaintiff due to the dark night, the 
on-coming vehicle, and plaintiff running directly into her 
path. Plaintiff also contends the "undisputed evidence" places 
plaintiff in the crosswalk until she reached the middle of 
the street and that she was then struck within 15 feet of the 
crosswalk. This also is not true since the defendant herself 
testified that the Plaintiff was far from the crosswalk when 
- O-
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seen and struck. This is the testimony the jury obviously 
believed and which must be viewed favorably by this Court, 
Plaintiff's counsel then suggests that we speculate with him 
when he states that "...any split-second delay in defendant's 
arrival at the point of impact would have prevented the 
collision, ...". There is no such evidence anywhere in the 
record nor is any referred to by counsel. 
The plain facts were that a girl on a dark night 
ran into the path of a car that she should have seen and stopped 
for just as her two girlfriends did and thereby avoid the 
collision that plaintiff suffered. For this the jury found 
the plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence caused 
her accident. 
The plaintiff received the jury trial she re-
quested. (R. 105). Whatever party requests trial by jury, 
that right is guarded jealously by this Court. 
This case having been tried to a 
jury, they were the exclusive judges 
of the evidence and of the inferences 
to be drawn therefrom. It was not the 
privilege of the Court to disagree with 
and overrule their action unless the 
evidence so unerringly pointed to a 
contrary conclusion that there existed 
no reasonable basis for the jury's 
finding. This Court has many times 
affirmed committment to a policy of 
reluctance to interfere with Findings 
of Fact and verdicts rendered by 
juries and has declared that it should 
be done only when the matter is so clear 
as to be free from doubt. (Citations 
omitted). In Butz v. Union Pac. R.R. 
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(citation omitted) we quoted with approval 
the language of Justice Murphy, speaking 
for the United States Supreme Court with 
respect to trial by jury: "* * * a right 
so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, 
whether guaranteed by the Constitution 
or provided by Statute, should be jealously 
guarded by the Courts.ff Again in Stickle v. 
Union Pac. R. R. Co., (citation omitted) 
we stated "* * * we remain cognizant of the 
vital importance of the privilege of the 
trial by jury in our system of justice and 
deem it our duty to zealously protect and 
preserve it." Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea 
Company, 5 U.2d 187, 299 P.2d 622, 626 (1966). 
From the rendition of the facts and argument 
thereon by the plaintiff in her brief it seems to merit the 
language of this Court in Douglas v. Duval1, 5 U.2d 429, 304 
P. 2d 373 (1956) where it is said: 
Plaintiffs' brief recites the facts 
most favorable to themselves, losers be-
low, which facts were sharply controverted, 
an approach this Court does not accept. 
(Citations omitted). 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 8 would 
have instructed the jury that the location of the accident 
was in a residential area. This fact should have hardly 
needed instruction since most of plaintiff's witnesses stated 
that they lived in this vicinity. The Instruction went on 
to state that one has a duty in a residential area to exercise 
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reasonable care to observe the presence of children or other 
persons who may reasonably be expected to be on or near the 
street upon which defendant's vehicle was being operated. 
Plaintiff gives no supporting authority for this 
Instruction, but as a compelling reason for giving it the 
plaintiff states that the accident in fact happened in a 
residential area. 
The Instruction was in fact covered by several 
others that were in fact given. Instruction No. 11 gives 
the usual definition of negligence requiring one to be reason-
able and prudent under the circumstances. (R. 72). Instruction 
No. 18 explains the requirement of maintaining a proper look-
out, to pay attention and to see what is in plain sight. (R.79). 
Instruction No. 20 explains the duty to yield the right-of-way 
to a pedestrian in a crosswalk. (R. 81). Instruction No. 22 
states that defendant is to operate her vehicle reasonably 
under the circumstances with regard for the surface and width 
of the road, the traffic and the actual or potential hazards. 
Emphasis added. (R. 83) Instruction No. 23 places the duty 
on a defendant to avoid danger, to be aware and to observe 
the highway conditions, the presence of pedestrians, and to 
maintain a lookout for persons in the vicinity. Emphasis 
added. (R. 84). 
These combined instructions cotfer all the points 
contained in plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 8 as well 
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as other points not covered. If any error be found in failing 
to give Instruction No. 8 such error, in view of the other 
instructions actually given, cannot reasonably be said to 
be of consequence or prejudicial. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The defendant incorporates herein the arguments 
already set forth in Point I. It is well established that 
the granting or refusing of a Motion for a New Trial based 
on insufficiency of evidence is largely within the discretion 
of the trial court. Moser v. Z.C.M.I., 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 
136 (1948); Reynolds v. W. W. Clyde § Co., 5 U.2d 151, 298 
P.2d 530 (1956). In the case of Gordon v. Provo City, 15 U.2d 
287, 291 P.2d 430 (1964), this Court said: 
The purpose of a trial is to 
afford the parties a full and fair 
opportunity to present their evidence 
and contentions and to have the issues 
in dispute between them determined by 
a jury. When this objective has been 
accomplished, and when the trial court 
has given its approval thereto by re-
fusing to grant a new trial, the judg-
ment should be looked upon with some 
degree of verity. The presumption is 
in favor of its validity and the burden 
is upon the appellant to show some 
pursuasive reason for upsetting it. 
(Citations). Under the cardinal and 
oft-repeated rule of review, we will 
not disturb the jury's finding so 
long as it is supported by substantial 
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evidence, that is, evidence which, 
together with the fair inferences 
that may be drawn therefrom, reason-
able minds could conclude as the jury 
did; (Citations). And we will not 
reverse the judgment entered thereon 
unless in arriving at it substantial 
and prejudicial error was committed 
in the sense that in its absence there 
is a reasonable likelihood that there 
V : would have been a different result. 
In the case of Wellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961), cited also by plaintiff, the trial 
court granted a new trial and the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Court's discretion. The case is cited here as support 
for the notion that the trial Judge's ruling on the Motion 
for a New Trial should be affirmed. The Court reasoned as 
follows: 
. . . since the trial Judge has seen 
and heard the witnesses and had a first-
hand view of all of the evidence, and the 
proceedings throughout the trial and has 
ruled on the admissibility of the evidence, 
and instructed the jury on the law governing 
their verdict, and had opportunity of obser-
ving the tactics of counsel throughout the 
trial and the jury's reaction thereto, his 
ruling on a Motion for a New Trial should 
not be overruled unless it clearly appears 
that he abused his discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower Court had an opportunity to grant 
a new trial if it believed all the circumstances warranted 
such action, but it has declined to do so. Since the verdict 
was supported by substantial evidence, together with the fact 
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that the jury was unanimous in finding the plaintiff negli-
gent, there has been no abuse of discretion and the Court's 
ruling on the new trial should be sustained. The evidence 
being considered as a whole points to numerous conflicts. 
These conflicts must be viewed in a light most favorable 
to the defendant, having prevailed below. Although conflicting, 
substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict in this case. 
Such evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the defendant. Where reasonable minds could have found as 
the jury did from the evidence before it, the trial court 
does not abuse its discretion in denying a Motion for a New 
Trial on the ground of insufficient evidence. The trial 
Court was not only aware of all of the evidence, but it was 
able to evaluate it in light of other observations made 
pending the trial. Based on the sufficiency of evidence and 
the Court's observations there was no abuse of discretion in 
refusing to grant a new trial. 
Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully 
submits the action of the Court and Jury below should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. MILLER 
BRANDT, MILLER, NELSON § CHRISTOPHERSON 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
_ T C 
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